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Abstract
We consider the problem of approximating Nash equilibria ofN functions f1, . . . , fN
of N variables. In particular, we deduce conditions under which systems of the form
u˙j(t) = −∇xjfj(u(t))
(j = 1, . . . , N) are well posed and in which the large time limits of their solutions
u(t) = (u1(t), . . . , uN (t)) are Nash equilibria for f1, . . . , fN . To this end, we will invoke
the theory of maximal monotone operators. We will also identify an application of
these ideas in game theory and show how to approximate equilibria in some game
theoretic problems in function spaces.
1 Introduction
Let us first recall the notion of a Nash equilibrium. Consider a collection ofN setsX1, . . . , XN
and define
X := X1 × · · · ×XN .
For a given x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ X, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and yj ∈ Xj, we will use the notation
(yj, x−j) for the point in X in which yj replaces xj in the coordinates of x. That is,
(yj, x−j) := (x1, . . . , xj−1, yj, xj+1, . . . , xN).
A collection of functions f1, . . . , fN : X → R has a Nash equilibrium at x ∈ X provided
fj(x) ≤ fj(yj, x−j)
for all yj ∈ Xj and j = 1, . . . , N .
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Nash recognized that an equilibrium is a fixed point of the set valued mapping
X 3 x 7→ arg min
y∈X
{
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j)
}
.
In particular, he applied Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [19] to show that if X1, . . . , XN are
nonempty, convex, compact subsets of Euclidean space and each f1, . . . , fN is multilinear,
then f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium at some x ∈ X [24, 25]. Nash was interested in
multilinear f1, . . . , fN as they correspond to the expected cost of players assuming mixed
strategies in noncooperative games. More generally, his existence theorem holds if each
fj : X → R is continuous and
X 3 y 7→
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j) is convex for each x ∈ X. (1.1)
As the existence of a Nash equilibrium is due to a nonconstructive fixed point theorem,
it seems unlikely that there are good ways to approximate these points. Indeed, it has
been established that the approximation of Nash equilibria is computationally challenging
[9,10,21]. Nevertheless, we contend that there is a nontrivial class of functions f1, . . . , fN for
which the approximation of Nash equilibria is at least theoretically feasible. We will explain
below that a sufficient condition for the approximation of Nash equilibria is that f1, . . . , fN
satisfy
N∑
j=1
(∇xjfj(x)−∇xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) ≥ 0 (1.2)
for each x, y ∈ X. Here we are considering each Xj as a subset of a Euclidean space and use
‘·’ to denote the dot products on any of these spaces.
Our approach starts with the observation that if (1.1) holds and X1, . . . , XN are convex,
then x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
N∑
j=1
∇xjfj(x) · (yj − xj) ≥ 0 (1.3)
for each y ∈ X. As a result, it is natural to consider the differential inequalities
N∑
j=1
(u˙j(t) +∇xjfj(u(t))) · (yj − uj(t)) ≥ 0 (1.4)
for t ≥ 0 and y ∈ X. Here
u : [0,∞)→ X; t 7→ (u1(t), . . . , uN(t))
is the unknown. We will below argue that for appropriately chosen initial condition u(0) ∈ X,
the Cesa`ro mean of u
t 7→ 1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
will converge to a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN as t→∞ provided that (1.2) holds.
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1.1 A few concrete examples
An elementary example which illustrates this approach may be observed when X1 = X2 =
[−1, 1], X = [−1, 1]2,
f1(x1, x2) = x1x2, and f2(x1, x2) = −x1x2.
It is not hard to check that the origin (0, 0) is the unique Nash equilibrium of f1, f2 and that
f1, f2 satisfy (1.2) (with equality holding) for each x, y ∈ [−1, 1]2. We now seek an absolutely
continuous path
u : [0,∞)→ [−1, 1]2
such that
(u˙1(t) + u2(t))(y1 − u1(t)) + (u˙2(t)− u1(t))(y2 − u2(t)) ≥ 0 (1.5)
holds for almost every t ≥ 0 and each (y1, y2) ∈ [−1, 1].
It turns out that if
u1(0)
2 + u2(0)
2 ≤ 1,
then the unique solution of these differential inequalities is
u1(t) = u1(0) cos(t)− u2(0) sin(t)
u2(t) = u2(0) cos(t) + u1(0) sin(t).
This solution simply parametrizes the circle of radius
√
u1(0)2 + u2(0)2. In particular,
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds = (0, 0).
For general initial conditions (u1(0), u2(0)) ∈ [−1, 1]2, it can be shown that u1(s)2+u2(s)2 ≤ 1
in a finite time s ≥ 0. Refer to Figure 1 for a schematic. It then follows that the same limit
above holds for this solution.
The method we present can be extended in certain cases when X1, . . . , XN are not com-
pact. For example, suppose X1 = X2 = R,
f1(x1, x2) =
1
2
x21 − x1x2 − x1, and f2(x1, x2) =
1
2
x22 + x1x2 − 2x2.
It is easy to check that f1, f2 satisfy (1.2). Furthermore,
∂x1f1(x1, x2) = x1 − x2 − 1 = 0
∂x2f2(x1, x2) = x2 + x1 − 2 = 0
3
x2
Figure 1: Plot of a solution u of (1.5) where the initial position of u is indicated in red. This
solution starts out on a circle centered at the origin traversing it counterclockwise until it
hits the boundary line segment (x1 = 1,−1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1). Then it proceeds upwards along this
boundary line segment until it arrives at some time s at the orange marker which is located
at (1, 0). For times t ≥ s, the position u(t) as shown in purple remains on the unit circle
traversing it counterclockwise.
provided
x1 =
3
2
and x2 =
1
2
.
As a result, this is the unique Nash equilibrium of f1, f2.
We note that the solution of
u˙1(t) = −(u1(t)− u2(t)− 1)
u˙2(t) = −(u2(t) + u1(t)− 2)
is given by 
u1(t) =
3
2
+
(
u1(0)− 3
2
)
e−t cos(t) +
(
u2(0)− 1
2
)
e−t sin(t)
u2(t) =
1
2
+
(
u2(0)− 1
2
)
e−t cos(t) +
(
3
2
− u1(0)
)
e−t sin(t).
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It is now clear that
lim
t→∞
(u1(t), u2(t)) =
(
3
2
,
1
2
)
.
In particular, we do not need to employ the Cesa`ro mean of u in order to approximate the
Nash equilibrium of f1, f2.
1.2 A general setting
It just so happens that our method does not rely on the spaces X1, . . . , XN being finite
dimensional. Consequently, we will consider the following version of our approximation
problem. Let V be a reflexive Banach space over R with norm ‖ · ‖ and continuous dual V ∗.
We further suppose
X1, . . . , XN ⊂ V are closed and convex with nonempty interiors
and consider N functions
f1, . . . , fN : X → R
which satisfy
f1, . . . , fN are weakly lowersemicontinuous,
X 3 y 7→
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j) is convex for each x ∈ X,
X 3 x 7→
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j) is weakly continuous for each y ∈ X, and
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≥ 0 for each x, y ∈ X.
(1.6)
In the last condition listed above, we mean
N∑
j=1
(pj − qj, xj − yj) ≥ 0
for each
pj ∈ ∂xjfj(x) := {ζ ∈ V ∗ : fj(z, x−j) ≥ fj(x) + (ζ, z − xj), z ∈ Xj}
and qj ∈ ∂xjfj(y) for j = 1, . . . , N .
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When V is finite dimensional, we naturally identify V and V ∗ with Euclidean space of
the same dimension. Alternatively, when V is infinite dimensional, we will suppose there is
a real Hilbert space H for which
V ⊂ H ⊂ V ∗
and V ⊂ H is continuously embedded. It is with respect to this space H in which we
consider the following initial value problem: for a given u0 ∈ X, find an absolutely continuous
u : [0,∞)→ HN such that
u(0) = u0, and
N∑
j=1
(u˙j(t) + ∂xjfj(u(t)), yj − uj(t)) ≥ 0 for a.e. t ≥ 0 and each y ∈ X.
(1.7)
Our central result involving this initial value problem is as follows. In this statement, we
will make use of the set
D =
{
x ∈ X :
N⋂
j=1
(
∂xjfj(x) + nXj(xj)
) ∩H 6= ∅} . (1.8)
Here nXj : V → 2V ∗ is the normal cone of Xj defined as
nXj(z) := {ζ ∈ V ∗ : (ζ, y − z) ≤ 0 all y ∈ Xj}
for z ∈ V (j = 1, . . . , N).
Theorem 1.1. Assume f1, . . . , fN satisfy (1.6).
(i) For any u0 ∈ D there is a unique Lipschitz continuous u : [0,∞) → HN satisfying
u(t) ∈ D for each t ≥ 0 and the initial value problem (1.7).
(ii) If f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium, then
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
converges weakly in H to a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN as t→∞.
We note that if X1 = · · · = XN = V , then nX1 ≡ · · · ≡ nXN ≡ {0}. In this case
D =
{
x ∈ X :
N⋂
j=1
(
∂xjfj(x) ∩H
) 6= ∅} ,
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and the initial value problem reduces to
u(0) = u0, and
u˙j(t) + ∂xjfj(u(t)) 3 0 for a.e. t ≥ 0 and each j = 1, . . . , N.
We will also explain that if in addition (∂x1f1, . . . , ∂xNfN) is single-valued, everywhere-
defined, monotone, and hemicontinuous we can obtain the same result as above without
assuming (1.6). This follows directly from a theorem of Browder and Minty.
We will phrase our initial value problem (1.7) as the evolution generated by a monotone
operator on HN with domain D. According to pioneering work of Bre´zis [5], the crucial
task will be to verify the maximality of this operator. Regarding the large time behavior of
solutions, the convergence to equilibria of maximal monotone operators by the Cesa`ro means
of semigroups they generate originates in the work of Bre´zis and Baillon [3]. We also refer
the reader to Chapter 3 of [2] which gives a detailed discussion of this phenomenon.
Of course, the asymptotic statements we made above are predicated on the existence of a
Nash equilibrium. This is only guaranteed to be the case if X is weakly compact or if there
is some θ > 0 such that
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≥ θ‖x− y‖2
for each x, y ∈ X. When such coercivity holds, f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium
and solutions of the initial value problem (1.7) converge exponentially fast in HN to this
equilibrium point.
We will prove Theorem 1.1 in the following section. Then we will apply this result to
flows in Euclidean spaces of the form (1.4) in section 3. Finally, we will consider examples
in Lebesgue and Sobolev spaces in section 4. A prototypical collection of functionals we will
study is
fj(v) =
∫
Ω
1
2
|∇vj|2 + Fj(v)dx
for j = 1, . . . , N , where v = (v1, . . . , vN) ∈ H10 (Ω)N and Ω ⊂ Rd is a bounded domain. For
this particular example, we will argue that if F1, . . . , FN : RN → R satisfy suitable growth
and monotonicity conditions, then f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium which can be
approximated by solutions u1, . . . , uN : Ω × [0,∞) → R of the parabolic initial/boundary
value problem 
∂tuj = ∆uj − ∂zjFj(u) in Ω× (0,∞)
uj = 0 on ∂Ω× (0,∞)
uj = u
0
j on Ω× {0}
for appropriately chosen initial conditions u01, . . . , u
0
N : Ω→ R.
We also remark that in finite dimensions, similar results were known to Fl˚am [15]. In par-
ticular, Fl˚am seems to be the first author to identify the important role of the monotonicity
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condition (1.2) in approximating Nash equilibrium. However, Rosen appears to be the first
to consider using equations such as (1.4) to approximate equilibrium points [26]. In addition,
we would like to point out that the finite dimensional variational inequality (1.3) and its re-
lation to Nash equilibrium is studied in depth in the monograph by Facchinei and Pang [13].
In infinite dimensions, there have also been several recent works which discuss discrete time
approximations for variational inequalities that correspond to Nash equilibrium [1,6,7,11,18].
Acknowledgements: This material is based upon work supported by the National
Science Foundation under Grants DMS-1440140, DMS-1554130, and HRD-1700236, the Na-
tional Security Agency under Grant No. H98230-20-1-0015, and the Sloan Foundation under
Grant No. G-2020-12602 while the authors participated in a program hosted by the Mathe-
matical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley, California, during the summer of 2020.
2 Approximation theorem
In this section, we will briefly recall the notion of a maximal monotone operator on a Hilbert
space and state a few key results for these operators. Then we will apply these results to
prove Theorem 1.1 and a few related corollaries.
2.1 Maximal monotone operators on a Hilbert space
Let H be Hilbert space with inner product 〈·, ·〉 and norm | · |. We will denote 2H as the
power set or collection of all subsets of H. We recall that B : H → 2H is monotone if
〈p− q, x− y〉 ≥ 0
for all x, y ∈ H, p ∈ Bx, and q ∈ By. Moreover, B is maximally monotone if the only
monotone C : H → 2H such that Bx ⊂ Cx for all x ∈ H is C = B. Minty’s well known
maximality criterion is as follows [22].
Theorem (Minty’s Lemma). A monotone operator B : H → 2H is maximal if and only if
for each y ∈ H, there is a unique x ∈ H such that
x+Bx 3 y.
Let us now recall a fundamental theorem for the initial value problem{
u˙(t) +Bu(t) 3 0, a.e. t ≥ 0
u(0) = u0.
(2.1)
As discussed in Chapter II of [5] and Chapter 3 of [2], the initial value problem is well-posed
provided that B is maximally monotone and u0 is an element of the domain of B
D(B) = {x ∈ H : Bx 6= ∅}.
8
Theorem (Bre´zis’s Theorem). Suppose B : H → 2H is maximally monotone and u0 ∈ D(B).
Then there is a unique Lipschitz continuous
u : [0,∞)→ H
solution of (2.1) such that u(t) ∈ D(B) for all t ≥ 0. Moreover,
|u˙(t)| ≤ min{|p| : p ∈ Bu0} (2.2)
for almost every t ≥ 0.
Remark 2.1. The full statement of Bre´zis’s Theorem (Theorem 3.1 of [2]) is more extensive
than what is written above.
Remark 2.2. We note that the right hand side of (2.2) is finite as the images of maximal
monotone operators are closed and convex subsets of H.
We also note that the operator B generates a contraction. Let u be a path as described
in Bre´zis’ Theorem, and suppose v : [0,∞)→ H is any other Lipschitz continuous path with
v(t) ∈ D(B) for t ≥ 0 and
v˙(t) +Bv(t) 3 0, a.e. t ≥ 0.
Then
|u(t)− v(t)| ≤ |u(0)− v(0)|, t ≥ 0. (2.3)
If, in addition, there is some λ > 0 such that
〈p− q, x− y〉 ≥ λ|x− y|2 (2.4)
for all x, y ∈ H, p ∈ Bx, and q ∈ By, then (2.3) can be improved to
|u(t)− v(t)| ≤ e−λt|u(0)− v(0)|, t ≥ 0. (2.5)
Remarkably, it is also possible to use solutions of the initial value problem (as described
in Bre´zis’s Theorem) to approximate equilibria of B. These are points y ∈ H such that
By 3 0.
The following theorem was proved in [3].
Theorem (The Baillon-Bre´zis Theorem). Suppose B has an equilibrium point and u is a
solution of the initial value problem (2.1). Then
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
converges weakly in H to some equilibrium point of B.
Remark 2.3. If B satisfies (2.4), it is plain to see that By 3 0 can have at most one solution.
In this case,
|u(t)− y| ≤ e−λt|u(0)− y|, t ≥ 0
for any solution of the initial value problem (2.1). This follows from (2.5) as v(t) = y is a
solution of the initial value problem with v(0) = y.
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2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Let us now suppose the spaces V , X1, . . . , XN , and H are as described in the subsection 1.2
of the introduction. We will further assume f1, . . . , fN : X → R are given functions which
satisfy (1.6). An elementary but important observation we will use is that a given y ∈ H
induces a linear form in V ∗ by the formula
(y, x) := 〈y, x〉, (x ∈ V ).
That this linear form is continuous is due to the continuity of the embedding V ⊂ H. For
convenience, we will use ‖ · ‖ to denote both the norm on V and the associated norm on V N .
Namely, we’ll write
‖x‖ =
(
N∑
j=1
‖xj‖2
)1/2
for x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ V N . We will also use this convention for the inner product 〈·, ·〉 and
norm | · | on H and on HN and the induced norm ‖ · ‖∗ on V ∗ and on (V ∗)N .
Let us specify A : HN → 2HN via
Ax =
{
(∂x1f1(x) + nX1(x1)) ∩H × · · · × (∂xNfN(x) + nXN (xN)) ∩H, x ∈ D
∅, x 6∈ D
for x ∈ HN . Here D is defined in (1.8).
Lemma 2.4. The domain of A is D, and A is monotone. Moreover, an absolutely continuous
u : [0,∞)→ HN solves {
u˙(t) + Au(t) 3 0, a.e. t ≥ 0
u(0) = u0
(2.6)
if and only it solves (1.7).
Proof. By definition, the domain of A is D. Suppose x, y ∈ D,
ζj ∈
(
∂xjfj(x) + nXj(xj)
) ∩H, and ξj ∈ (∂xjfj(y) + nXj(yj)) ∩H
for j = 1, . . . , N . In view of the last condition listed in (1.6) and the fact that each nXj is
monotone,
N∑
j=1
〈ζj − ξj, xj − yj〉 =
N∑
j=1
(ζj − ξj, xj − yj) ≥ 0.
Thus, A is monotone.
Note that if u solves (2.6), then
−u˙j(t) ∈ (∂xjfj(u(t)) + nXj(uj(t))) ∩H ⊂ ∂xjfj(u(t)) + nXj(uj(t))
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for almost every t ≥ 0 and each j = 1, . . . , N . It now follows from the definition of the
normal cone that u is a solution of (1.7). Conversely, if u solves (1.7) then
−u˙j(t) ∈ ∂xjfj(u(t)) + nXj(uj(t))
for almost every t ≥ 0 and each j = 1, . . . , N . As u is absolutely continuous, −u˙(t) ∈ H for
almost every t ≥ 0, and therefore, −u˙(t) ∈ Au(t) for almost every t ≥ 0.
In view of Bre´zis’ Theorem and the Baillon-Bre´zis Theorem, we can conclude Theorem
1.1 once we verify that A is maximal. To this end, we will verify the hypotheses of Minty’s
Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. For a given y ∈ HN , it suffices to show there is x ∈ X such that
N∑
j=1
(xj + ∂xjfj(x)− yj, zj − xj) ≥ 0 (2.7)
for each z ∈ X. In this case, yj − xj ∈ H and
yj − xj ∈ ∂xjfj(x) + nXj(xj)
for j = 1, . . . , N so that x ∈ D and y − x ∈ Ax.
In order to solve (2.7), we will employ the auxiliary functions defined by
gj(x) :=
1
2
‖xj‖2 − (yj, xj) + fj(x)
for x ∈ X and j = 1, . . . , N . In view of (1.6),
g1, . . . , gN are weakly lowersemicontinuous,
X 3 y 7→
N∑
j=1
gj(yj, x−j) is convex for each x ∈ X,
X 3 x 7→
N∑
j=1
gj(yj, x−j) is weakly continuous for each y ∈ X, and
N∑
j=1
(∂xjgj(x)− ∂xjgj(y), xj − yj) ≥ ‖x− y‖2 for each x, y ∈ X.
(2.8)
Note that x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of g1, . . . , gN if and only if x solves (2.7). Since we are
assuming that each Xj has nonempty interior, this follows from the Pshenichnii–Rockafellar
conditions for the minimum of a proper, lowersemicontinuous, convex function on a closed
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subset of a Banach space (Theorem 4.3.6 of [4]). Consequently, we now aim to show that
g1, . . . , gN has a Nash equilibrium.
For each r > 0, set
Xr := {x ∈ X : ‖x‖ ≤ r}.
It is clear that Xr is convex and weakly closed. And as each X1, . . . , XN is nonempty,
Xr is nonempty for all r greater or equal to some fixed s > 0. Let us consider the map
Φr : Xr → 2Xr specified as
Φr(x) := arg min
y∈Xr
{
N∑
j=1
gj(yj, x−j)
}
(x ∈ Xr) for r > s.
The first and second properties of g1, . . . , gN listed in (2.8) imply that Φ
r(x) 6= ∅ and
convex for any x ∈ Xr and r > s; and the first and third properties imply that the graph of
Φr is weakly closed. Indeed let us suppose (xk)k∈N, (yk)k∈N ⊂ X, xk ⇀ x, yk ⇀ y, and
N∑
j=1
gj(y
k
j , x
k
−j) ≤
N∑
j=1
gj(zj, x
k
−j)
for each z ∈ X with ‖z‖ ≤ r and all k ∈ N. We can then send k →∞ to get
N∑
j=1
gj(yj, x−j) ≤
N∑
j=1
gj(zj, x−j).
The Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem [14, 16, 19] then implies there is xr ∈ Φr(xr). In
particular,
N∑
j=1
gj(x
r) ≤
N∑
j=1
gj(zj, x
r
−j) (2.9)
for each z ∈ X with ‖z‖ ≤ r. It follows that there are prj ∈ ∂xjgj(xr) for each j = 1, . . . , N
such that
N∑
j=1
(prj , zj − xrj) ≥ 0
for all z ∈ X with ‖z‖ ≤ r. Since u0 ∈ D, there are
wj ∈ ∂xjgj(u0)
for j = 1, . . . , N .
Note that the fourth listed property of g1, . . . , gN in (2.8) gives
‖xr − u0‖2 ≤
N∑
j=1
(prj − wj, xrj − u0j)
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≤
N∑
j=1
(−wj, xrj − u0j)
≤ ‖w‖∗‖xr − u0‖
for all r sufficiently large. As a result, there is a sequence (rk)k∈N which increases to infinity
such that (xrk)k∈N ⊂ X converges weakly to some x ∈ X. Upon sending r = rk → ∞ in
(2.9), we find that x is the desired Nash equilibrium of g1, . . . , gN .
Corollary 2.5. If X is weakly compact, then f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If X is weakly compact, we can repeat the argument given in the proof above used
to show g1, . . . , gN : X
r → R has a Nash equilibrium. All we would need to do is to replace
Xr with X and g1, . . . , gN with f1, . . . , fN .
Corollary 2.6. Suppose there is θ > 0 such that
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≥ θ‖x− y‖2
for each x, y ∈ X. Then f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium z ∈ X. Moreover, if
u : [0,∞)→ HN is a solution of the initial value problem as described in Theorem 1.1, there
is λ > 0 such that
|u(t)− z| ≤ e−λt|u(0)− z| (2.10)
for each t ≥ 0.
Proof. We can repeat the argument given in the proof of Theorem 1.1 that shows g1, . . . , gN
has a Nash equilibrium to conclude that f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium.
If x is a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN , then
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x), zj − xj) ≥ 0
for each z ∈ X. Likewise,
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(y), wj − yj) ≥ 0
for each w ∈ X if y is another Nash equilibrium. Choosing z = y and w = x and adding
these inequalities give
θ‖x− y‖2 ≤
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≤ 0.
As V N ⊂ HN is continuously embedded, there is a constant C > 0 such that
|x| ≤ C‖x‖, x ∈ V N .
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Setting
λ :=
θ
C2
,
gives
〈Ax− Ay, x− y〉 ≥ θ‖x− y‖2 ≥ λ|x− y|2
for x, y ∈ D(A). The inequality (2.10) now follows from Remark 2.3.
We now consider the special case mentioned in the introduction. In the statement below,
we will suppose that V and H are as above. However, we will not assume f1, . . . , fN satisfy
(1.6). We also note that the proof essentially follows from an observation made by Bre´zis in
Remark 2.3.7 of [5].
Theorem 2.7. Suppose f1, . . . , fN : V
N → R satisfy
∂xjfj(x) = {∇xjfj(x)} for each x ∈ V N ,
∇xjfj(x+ ty) ⇀ ∇xjfj(x) as t→ 0+ for each x, y ∈ V N , and
N∑
j=1
(∇xjfj(x)−∇xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≥ 0 for each x, y ∈ V N ,
and define
D = {x ∈ V N : ∇x1f1(x), . . . ,∇xNfN(x) ∈ H}.
Then for each u0 ∈ D, there is a unique Lipschitz continuous u : [0,∞) → HN such that
u(t) ∈ D for each t ≥ 0 and
u(0) = u0, and
u˙j(t) +∇xjfj(u(t)) = 0 for a.e. t ≥ 0 and each j = 1, . . . , N.
Proof. It suffices to show that A : HN → 2HN defined via
Ax :=
{
{(∇x1f1(x), . . . ,∇xNfN(x))}, x ∈ D
∅, x 6∈ D
(x ∈ HN) is maximal. To this end, we first consider the operator B : V N → (V ∗)N defined
via
Bx := (x1 +∇x1f1(x), . . . , xN +∇xNfN(x))
for x ∈ V N . Notice that
B(x+ ty) ⇀ Bx
and
(Bx−By, x− y) ≥ ‖x− y‖2
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for all x, y ∈ V N .
By a theorem due independently to Browder [8] and Minty [23], B is surjective; see also
Corollary 1.8 of [20]. In particular, if y ∈ HN , there is x ∈ V N such that
Bx = y.
That is,
xj +∇xjfj(x) = yj
for j = 1, . . . , N . Then ∇xjfj(x) = yj − xj ∈ H for j = 1, . . . , N , which implies x ∈ D and
x+ Ax 3 y.
Remark 2.8. If f1, . . . , fN additionally satisfy
N∑
j=1
(∇xjfj(x)−∇xjfj(y), xj − yj) ≥ θ‖x− y‖2
(x, y ∈ V N), then f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium and (2.10) holds for any u(0) ∈ D.
3 Finite dimensional flows
In this section, we will study a few implications of Theorem 1.1 in the particular case
V = H = Rd
equipped with the standard Euclidean dot product and norm. As there is just one topology
to consider, the statements we’ll make will be simpler than in the infinite dimensional setting.
We will also identify a potential application to noncooperative games.
3.1 Compact domains
Let X = X1×· · ·×XN , where X1, . . . , XN ⊂ Rd are convex, compact subsets with nonempty
interior. Further assume
f1, . . . , fN : X → R are continuous,
X 3 y 7→
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j) is convex for each x ∈ X, and
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) ≥ 0 for each x, y ∈ X.
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As before we set
D =
{
x ∈ X :
N⋂
j=1
(∂xjfj(x) + nXj(x)) 6= ∅
}
,
where
nXj(z) = {ζ ∈ Rd : ζ · (y − z) ≤ 0 for all y ∈ Xj}
(j = 1, . . . , N). Theorem 1.1 implies the following.
Proposition 3.1. For each u0 ∈ D, there is a unique Lipschitz continuous u : [0,∞)→ RNd
with u(t) ∈ D for t ≥ 0 and which satisfies
u(0) = u0, and
N∑
j=1
(u˙j(t) + ∂xjfj(u(t))) · (yj − uj(t)) ≥ 0 for a.e. t ≥ 0 and each y ∈ X.
Furthermore, the limit
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
exists and equals a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN .
Remark 3.2. In view of Corollary 2.6, if
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) ≥ θ|x− y|2
for x, y,∈ X, f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium and the solution u in the proposition
above converges exponentially fast to this equilibrium point.
3.2 An application to game theory
Again suppose X1, . . . , XN ⊂ Rd are convex, compact subsets with nonempty interior. An-
other interesting case to consider is when f1, . . . , fN : X → R are each N -linear. That
is,
Xj 3 yj 7→ fj(yj, x−j) is linear (3.1)
for each j = 1, . . . , N and x ∈ X. These are precisely the types of functions Nash considered
in his celebrated work on noncooperative games [24,25]. Note that (3.1) implies
yj · ∇xjfj(x) = fj(yj, x−j) (3.2)
for yj ∈ Xj, x ∈ RNd, and j = 1, . . . , N . Consequently,
N∑
j=1
(∇xjfj(x)−∇xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) = N∑
j=1
(fj(x)− fj(yj, x−j) + fj(y)− fj(xj, y−j)) ≥ 0
16
if and only if
N∑
j=1
(fj(x) + fj(y)) ≥
N∑
j=1
(fj(yj, x−j) + fj(xj, y−j)). (3.3)
With these assumptions, Theorem 1.1 implies the following statement.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose f1, . . . , fN are N-linear and satisfy (3.3). Then for each u
0 ∈ X,
there is a unique Lipschitz u : [0,∞)→ X such that
u(0) = u0
N∑
j=1
(u˙j(t) +∇xjfj(u(t))) · (yj − uj(t)) ≥ 0, for a.e. t ≥ 0 and all y ∈ X.
(3.4)
Moreover,
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
converges as t→∞ to a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN .
Remark 3.4. Using (3.2), we can rewrite the inequality in (3.4) as
N∑
j=1
(u˙j(t) · (yj − uj(t)) + fj(yj, u−j(t))− fj(u(t))) ≥ 0.
3.3 The whole space
Finally, we consider the case where f1, . . . , fN are defined on the whole space RNd. We will
assume 
f1, . . . , fN are continuous,
RNd 3 y 7→
N∑
j=1
fj(yj, x−j) is convex for each x ∈ RNd, and
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) ≥ 0 for each x, y ∈ RNd.
Let us also set
D :=
{
x ∈ RNd :
N⋂
j=1
∂xjfj(x) 6= ∅
}
.
Theorem 1.1 gives us the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.5. For each u0 ∈ D, there is a unique Lipschitz continuous u : [0,∞)→ RNd
such that u(t) ∈ D for each t ≥ 0 and which satisfies
u(0) = u0
u˙j(t) + ∂xjfj(u(t)) 3 0, for a.e. t ≥ 0 and j = 1, . . . , N .
If f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium, then
lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
u(s)ds
exists and is also Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.6. If
N∑
j=1
(∂xjfj(x)− ∂xjfj(y)) · (xj − yj) ≥ θ|x− y|2
for all x, y ∈ RNd and some θ > 0, then f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash equilibrium at some
z ∈ RNd and
|u(t)− z| ≤ e−θt|u0 − z|, t ≥ 0.
Remark 3.7. A basic example we had in mind when considering Proposition 3.5 was
fj(x) =
N∑
k,`=1
1
2
Ajk,`xk · x`
for x = (x1, . . . , xN) ∈ RNd and j = 1, . . . , N . Here Ajk,` are d× d symmetric matrices which
additionally satisfy
Ajk,` = A
j
`,k
(j, k, ` = 1, . . . , N). The required monotonicity condition on f1, . . . , fN is satisfied provided
N∑
j,k=1
Ajk,jyj · yk ≥ 0
for each y ∈ RNd.
4 Examples in function spaces
In this final section, we will apply the ideas we have developed to consider functionals defined
on Lebesgue and Sobolev spaces. As we have done above, we will consider both the existence
of Nash equilibria and their approximation by continuous time flows. Throughout, we will
assume Ω ⊂ Rd is a bounded domain with smooth boundary. We will also change notation
by using v for the variables in which our functionals are defined. This allows us to reserve x
for points in Ω. Finally, we will use | · | for any norm on a finite dimensional space.
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4.1 A few remarks on Sobolev spaces
Before discussing examples, let us recall a few facts about Sobolev spaces and establish some
notation. A good reference for this material is Chapter 5 and 6 of [12]. First we note
H10 (Ω) ⊂ L2(Ω) ⊂ H−1(Ω)
where each inclusion is compact. Here L2(Ω) is the space of Lebesgue measurable functions
on Ω which are square integrable equipped with the standard inner product. The space
H10 (Ω) is the closure of all smooth functions having compact support in Ω in the norm
u 7→
(∫
Ω
|Du|2dx
)1/2
.
The topological dual of H10 (Ω) is denoted H
−1(Ω). Recall that the Dirichlet Laplacian
−∆ : H10 (Ω)→ H−1(Ω) is defined via
(−∆u, v) =
∫
Ω
Du ·Dvdx
for u, v ∈ H10 (Ω). Here we are using (·, ·) as the natural pairing between H−1(Ω) and H10 (Ω).
Moreover, −∆ is an isometry; in particular, this map is invertible. This allows us to define
the following inner product on H−1(Ω)
(f, g) 7→ (f, (−∆)−1g).
We also note that if f ∈ L2(Ω), the inner product between f and g simplifies to
(f, (−∆)−1g) =
∫
Ω
f(−∆)−1gdx.
In addition, we will consider the space H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω) consisting of H10 (Ω) functions for
which −∆u ∈ L2(Ω). This is a Hilbert space endowed with the inner product
(u, v) 7→
∫
Ω
∆u ∆vdx.
4.2 H = L2(Ω)
For v ∈ H10 (Ω)N , define
fj(v) =
∫
Ω
Hj(∇vj) + Fj(v)− hjvj dx
for j = 1, . . . , N . Here each hj ∈ L2(Ω), and Hj : Rd → R is assumed to be smooth and
satisfy
θ|p− q|2 ≤ (∇Hj(p)−∇Hj(q)) · (p− q) ≤ 1
θ
|p− q|2 (4.1)
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for all p, q ∈ Rd and some θ ∈ (0, 1]. We’ll also suppose F1, . . . , FN : RN → R are smooth,
N∑
j=1
(∂zjFj(z)− ∂zjFj(w))(zj − wj) ≥ 0
for z, w ∈ RN , and there is C such that
|Fj(z)| ≤ C(1 + |z|2) and |∂zjFj(z)| ≤ C(1 + |z|) (4.2)
for z ∈ RN and j = 1, . . . , N .
Using these assumptions, it is straightforward to verify that f1, . . . , fN fulfills (1.6) with
X1 = · · · = XN = V = H10 (Ω). The following lemma also follows by routine computations.
Lemma 4.1. For each v, w ∈ H10 (Ω)N and j = 1, . . . , N ,
∂vjfj(v) = {∇vjfj(v)}
with
(∇vjfj(v), wj) =
∫
Ω
∇Hj(∇vj) · ∇wj + ∂zjFj(v)wj − hjwjdx
and
N∑
j=1
(∇vjfj(v)−∇vjfj(w), vj − wj) ≥ θ
∫
Ω
|∇v −∇w|2dx.
Moreover, v is a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN if and only if it is a weak solution of{
−div(∇Hj(∇vj)) + ∂zjFj(v) = hj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
(j = 1, . . . , N).
Remark 4.2. In this statement, (·, ·) denotes the natural pairing between H−1(Ω) and H10 (Ω).
We now can state a result involving the approximation of Nash equilibrium for f1, . . . , fN .
Proposition 4.3. Let u0 ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
u : [0,∞)→ L2(Ω)N ; t 7→ u(·, t)
such that u(·, t) ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N for each t ≥ 0 and
∂tuj = div(∇Hj(∇uj))− ∂zjFj(u) + hj in Ω× (0,∞)
uj = 0 on ∂Ω× (0,∞)
uj = u
0
j on Ω× {0}
(4.3)
(j = 1, . . . , N). Furthermore, there is λ > 0 such that∫
Ω
|u(x, t)− v(x)|2dx ≤ e−2λt
∫
Ω
|u0(x)− v(x)|2dx
for t ≥ 0. Here v is the unique Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN .
20
Remark 4.4. For almost every t ≥ 0, the PDE in (4.3) holds almost everywhere in Ω; the
boundary condition holds in the trace sense; and u(·, 0) = u0 as L2(Ω)N functions.
Proof. Suppose that ζ ∈ L2(Ω)N and v ∈ H10 (Ω)N is a weak solution of{
−div(∇Hj(∇vj)) + ∂zjFj(v) = hj + ζj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω.
As ∂Ω is assumed to be smooth and in view of the hypothesis (4.1), elliptic regularity
(Theorem 1, section 8.3 of [12]) implies v ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N . Therefore,{
v ∈ H10 (Ω)N : ∇v1f1(v), . . . ,∇vNfN(v) ∈ L2(Ω)
}
= (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N .
Theorem 1.1 and Corollary 2.6 now allow us to conclude.
4.3 Another example with H = L2(Ω)
Define
fj(v) =
∫
Ω
Lj(∇v1, . . . ,∇vN)− hjvj dx
for v ∈ H10 (Ω)N . Here h1, . . . , hN ∈ L2(Ω) and each Lj : RNd → R is smooth with
θ|p− q|2 ≤
N∑
j=1
(∇pjLj(p)−∇pjLj(q)) · (pj − qj) ≤
1
θ
|p− q|2 (4.4)
for all p, q ∈ RNd and some θ ∈ (0, 1]. We’ll also assume there is C > 0 such that
|∇pjLj(p)| ≤ C(1 + |p|)
for each p ∈ RNd and j = 1, . . . , N .
Direct computation gives the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. For each v, w ∈ H10 (Ω)N and j = 1, . . . , N ,
∂vjfj(v) = {∇vjfj(v)}
with
(∇vjfj(v), wj) =
∫
Ω
∇pjLj(∇v1, . . . ,∇vN) · ∇wj − hjwj dx
and
N∑
j=1
(∇vjfj(v)−∇vjfj(w), vj − wj) ≥ θ
∫
Ω
|∇v −∇w|2dx.
Moreover,
∇vjfj(v + tw) ⇀ ∇vjfj(v)
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as t→ 0+, and v is a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN if and only if it is a weak solution of{
−div(∇pjLj(∇v1, . . . ,∇vN)) = hj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
(j = 1, . . . , N).
With this lemma, we can now establish the subsequent assertion about the Nash equilib-
rium of f1, . . . , fN .
Proposition 4.6. Let u0 ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
u : [0,∞)→ L2(Ω)N ; t 7→ u(·, t)
such that u(·, t) ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N for each t ≥ 0 and
∂tuj = div(∇pjLj(∇u1, . . . ,∇uN)) + hj in Ω× (0,∞)
uj = 0 on ∂Ω× (0,∞)
uj = u
0
j on Ω× {0}
(j = 1, . . . , N). Furthermore, there is λ > 0 such that∫
Ω
|u(x, t)− v(x)|2dx ≤ e−2λt
∫
Ω
|u0(x)− v(x)|2dx
for t ≥ 0. Here v is the unique Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN .
Proof. Suppose that ξ ∈ L2(Ω)N and v ∈ H10 (Ω)N is a weak solution of{
−div(∇pjLj(∇v1, . . . ,∇vN)) = hj + ξj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω.
By the uniform estimate (4.4), elliptic regularity implies v ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩ H10 (Ω))N (see the
remark at the end of section 9.1 in [12]). As a result,{
v ∈ H10 (Ω)N : ∇v1f1(v), . . . ,∇vNfN(v) ∈ L2(Ω)
}
= (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N .
We then conclude by Theorem 2.7 and Remark 2.8.
4.4 H = H−1(Ω)
For a given v ∈ L2(Ω)N , set
fj(v) =
∫
Ω
Fj(v)dx− 〈hj, vj〉
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for j = 1, . . . , N . Here h1, . . . , hN ∈ H−1(Ω), and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in H−1(Ω).
We will assume F1, . . . , FN : RN → R are smooth and satisfy (4.2) and
|∂zk∂zjFj(z)| ≤ C
θ|z − w|2 ≤
N∑
i=1
(∂ziFi(z)− ∂ziFi(w))(zi − wi)
(4.5)
for z, w ∈ RN , j, k = 1, . . . , N , and some C, θ > 0. For convenience, we will also assume
∂zjFj(0) = 0 (4.6)
for j = 1, . . . , N .
The following observations can be verified by routine computations.
Lemma 4.7. For each v, w ∈ L2(Ω)N and j = 1, . . . , N ,
∂vjfj(v) = {∇vjfj(v)}
with
∇vjfj(v) = ∂zjFj(v)− (−∆)−1hj.
Moreover, v ∈ H10 (Ω)N is a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN if and only if it is a weak solution
of {
−∆(∂zjFj(v)) = hj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
(4.7)
(j = 1, . . . , N).
By Proposition A.1 in the appendix, there are smooth functions G1, . . . , GN such that
∂zjFj(z) = yj if and only if ∂yjGj(y) = zj
|Gj(y)| ≤ B(1 + |y|2) and |∂yjGj(y)| ≤ B(1 + |y|)
0 ≤
N∑
i=1
(∂yiGi(y)− ∂yiGi(z)) (yi − zi)
|∂yk∂yjGj(y)| ≤
1
θ
(4.8)
for all y, z ∈ RN , j, k = 1, . . . , N and some constant B. Notice that in view of (4.6)
∂yjGj(0) = 0
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for j = 1, . . . , N . Thus, it is possible to solve (4.7) by choosing
wj = (−∆)−1hj ∈ H10 (Ω)
for j = 1, . . . , N and then setting
vj = ∂yjGj(w)
for j = 1, . . . , N . In particular, we have just shown that f1, . . . , fN has a Nash equilibrium,
and it is not hard to see it is unique.
Let us now see how to approximate this Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4.8. Let u0 ∈ H10 (Ω)N . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
u : [0,∞)→ H−1(Ω)N ; t 7→ u(·, t)
such that u(·, t) ∈ H10 (Ω)N for each t ≥ 0 and
∂tuj = ∆(∂zjFj(u))− hj in Ω× (0,∞)
uj = 0 on ∂Ω× (0,∞)
uj = u
0
j on Ω× {0}
(j = 1, . . . , N). Furthermore, there is λ > 0 such that
‖u(·, t)− v‖ ≤ e−λt‖u0 − v‖
for t ≥ 0. Here ‖ · ‖ denotes the norm on H−1(Ω)N and v is the Nash equilibrium of
f1, . . . , fN .
Proof. Define A : H−1(Ω)N → 2H−1(Ω)N as
Av =
{
{(−∆(∂z1F1(v)) + h1, . . . ,−∆(∂zNFN(v)) + hN)}, v ∈ H10 (Ω)N
∅, otherwise
for v ∈ H−1(Ω)N . We note that D(A) = H10 (Ω)N , and 0 ∈ Av if and only if v ∈ H10 (Ω)N is
a Nash equilibrium for f1, . . . , fN . By the second inequality listed in (4.5),
〈Av − Aw, v − w〉 =
∫
Ω
N∑
j=1
(∂zjFj(v)− ∂zjFj(w))(vj − wj)dx
≥ θ
∫
Ω
|v − w|2dx
≥ λ‖v − w‖2
for v, w ∈ H10 (Ω)N and some λ > 0.
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As a result, it suffices to check that A is maximal. This amounts to finding a weak
solution v ∈ H10 (Ω)N of {
vj −∆(∂zjFj(v)) = hj + ζj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
(4.9)
for a given ζ ∈ H−1(Ω)N . To this end, we consider the auxiliary problem of finding w ∈
H10 (Ω)
N such that {
∂yjGj(w)−∆wj = hj + ζj in Ω
wj = 0 on ∂Ω.
(4.10)
If we can find w, then v ∈ H10 (Ω)N defined by
vj = ∂yjGj(w)
(j = 1, . . . , N) is a solution of (4.9).
Notice that (4.10) has a solution if and only if
gj(w) =
∫
Ω
Gj(w) +
1
2
|∇wj|2dx− (hj + ζj, wj) (4.11)
(w ∈ H10 (Ω)N , j = 1, . . . , N) has a Nash equilibrium. Here (·, ·) is the natural pairing between
H−1(Ω) and H10 (Ω). Using (4.8), it is straightforward to check that g1, . . . , gN satisfies the
properties listed in (1.6) with X1 = · · · = XN = V = H10 (Ω). As a result, Corollary 2.6
implies that g1, . . . , gN has a Nash equilibrium.
4.5 H = H10(Ω)
Set
fj(v) =
∫
Ω
Fj(∆v)−∇hj · ∇vj dx
for v ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N and j = 1, . . . , N . Here h1, . . . , hN ∈ H10 (Ω) and
∆v = (∆v1, . . . ,∆vN).
We will suppose F1, . . . , FN : RN → R are smooth and satisfy (4.5) and (4.6). A few key
observations regarding f1, . . . fN are as follows.
Lemma 4.9. For each v, w ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N and j = 1, . . . , N ,
∂vjfj(v) = {∇vjfj(v)}
with
(∇vjfj(v), wj) =
∫
Ω
∂zjFj(∆v)∆wj −∇hj · ∇wjdx.
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Moreover, v is a Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN if and only if it is a solution of{
−∂zjFj(∆v) = hj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
(4.12)
(j = 1, . . . , N).
Remark 4.10. Above, (·, ·) denotes the natural pairing between (H2(Ω) ∩ H10 (Ω))∗ and
H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω).
Using the functions G1, . . . , GN from the previous subsection, we can solve{
−∆vj = −∂yjGj(−h) in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω,
for j = 1, . . . , N to obtain a solution of (4.12). It follows that f1, . . . , fN has a unique Nash
equilibrium v, which belongs to the space
D = {v ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N : ∆v ∈ H10 (Ω)N} .
As with our previous examples, we can approximate this Nash equilibrium with a continuous
time flow.
Proposition 4.11. Let u0 ∈ D. There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
u : [0,∞)→ H10 (Ω)N ; t 7→ u(·, t)
such that u(·, t) ∈ D for each t ≥ 0 and
∂tuj = ∂zjFj(∆u) + hj in Ω× (0,∞)
uj = 0 on ∂Ω× (0,∞)
uj = u
0
j on Ω× {0}
(j = 1, . . . , N). Furthermore, there is λ > 0 such that∫
Ω
|∇u(x, t)−∇v(x)|2dx ≤ e−2λt
∫
Ω
|∇u0(x)−∇v(x)|2dx
for t ≥ 0. Here v is the unique Nash equilibrium of f1, . . . , fN .
Proof. Define A : H10 (Ω)
N → 2H10 (Ω)N by
Av =
{
{(−∂z1F1(∆v)− h1, . . . ,−∂zNFN(∆v)− hN)}, v ∈ D
∅, otherwise
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for v ∈ H10 (Ω)N . Note that D(A) = D, and 0 ∈ Av if and only if v ∈ D is a Nash equilibrium
for f1, . . . , fN . In view of (4.5),
〈Av − Aw, v − w〉 =
∫
Ω
N∑
j=1
(∂zjFj(∆v)− ∂zjFj(∆w))(∆vj −∆wj)dx
≥ θ
∫
Ω
|∆v −∆w|2dx
≥ λ
∫
Ω
|∇v −∇w|2dx.
for v, w ∈ D and some λ > 0.
Therefore, it suffices to show{
vj − ∂zjFj(∆v) = hj + ζj in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω
has a solution v ∈ (H2(Ω) ∩ H10 (Ω))N for a given ζ ∈ H10 (Ω)N . We note that any such
solution v will automatically belong to D. Moreover, this is equivalent to finding a weak
solution v ∈ H10 (Ω)N of {
∂yjGj(v − h− ζ)−∆vj = 0 in Ω
vj = 0 on ∂Ω.
(4.13)
We emphasize that elliptic regularity implies that any such weak solution actually belongs
to (H2(Ω) ∩H10 (Ω))N .
Any v ∈ H10 (Ω)N which solves (4.13) is a Nash equilibrium of g1, . . . , gN defined by
gj(v) =
∫
Ω
Gj(v − h− ζ) + 1
2
|∇vj|2dx.
As we did when considering the functions defined in (4.11), we can apply Corollary 2.6 and
conclude that g1, . . . , gN has a unique Nash equilibrium.
A Dual functions
In this appendix, we will verify a technical assertion that was used to establish the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in a few of the examples we considered above.
Proposition A.1. Suppose F1, . . . , FN : RN → R are smooth and satisfy
|Fj(z)| ≤ C(1 + |z|2) (A.1)
for z ∈ RN and j = 1, . . . , N and
θ|z − w|2 ≤
N∑
j=1
(
∂zjFj(z)− ∂zjFj(w)
)
(zj − wj) (A.2)
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for z, w ∈ RN and some θ > 0. There are smooth functions G1, . . . , GN : RN → R with the
following properties.
(i) ∂zjFj(z) = yj if and only if ∂yjGj(y) = zj.
(ii) For all j, k = 1, . . . , N and y ∈ RN ,
|∂yk∂yjGj(y)| ≤
1
θ
.
(iii) For each y, w ∈ RN ,
0 ≤
N∑
j=1
(
∂yjGj(y)− ∂yjGj(w)
)
(yj − wj).
(iv) There is a constant B such that
|Gj(y)| ≤ B(1 + |y|2) and |∂yjGj(y)| ≤ B(1 + |y|)
for y ∈ RN and j = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. First we note that the mapping of RN
z 7→ (∂z1F1(z), . . . , ∂zNFN(z)) (A.3)
is invertible. This follows from the theorem due to Browder [8] and Minty [23] as (A.2) implies
that this map is both monotone and coercive; invertibility is a consequence of Hadamard’s
global invertibility theorem (Theorem A of [17]), as well. The condition (A.2) also gives
θ|v|2 ≤
N∑
j,k=1
∂zk∂zjFj(z)vkvj (A.4)
for each z, v ∈ RN .
Now fix y ∈ RN and let z ∈ RN be the unique Nash equilibrium of
RN 3 x 7→ Fj(x)− yjxj
(j = 1, . . . , N). Such a Nash equilibrium exists for these N functions by Corollary 2.6. As
a result,
∂zjFj(z) = yj, j = 1, . . . , N. (A.5)
Since (A.3) is invertible and smooth, (A.5) determines z as a smooth function of y. Let us
now define
Gj(y) := zjyj − Fj(z) (A.6)
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for j = 1, . . . , N . Differentiating with respect to yj and using (A.5), we find
∂yjGj(y) = zj.
This proves (i) and that
y 7→ (∂y1G1(y), . . . , ∂yNGN(y))
is the inverse mapping of (A.3).
It follows from part (i) and the inverse function theorem that whenever ∂yjGj(y) = zj
and ∂zjFj(z) = yj for j = 1, . . . , N , the matrices
(∂zk∂zjFj(z))
N
j,k=1 and (∂yk∂yjGj(y))
N
j,k=1
are inverses. Consequently, for a given w ∈ RN , we can choose v ∈ RN defined as
vj =
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wk
in (A.4) to get
0 ≤ θ
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wk
)2
≤
N∑
j,k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wkwj (A.7)
=
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wk
)
wj
≤
√√√√ N∑
j=1
(
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wk
)2
· |w|.
As a result,
N∑
j=1
(
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(y)wk
)2
≤ 1
θ2
|w|2.
Upon selecting w = ek, the kth standard unit vector in RN , we find
(∂yk∂yjGj(y))
2 =
(
N∑
`=1
∂y`∂yjGj(y)w`
)2
≤
N∑
i=1
(
N∑
`=1
∂y`∂yiGi(y)w`
)2
≤ 1
θ2
for j, k = 1, . . . , N . We conclude assertion (ii).
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Part (iii) follows directly from (A.7). Indeed, for any y, w ∈ RN , we can use the funda-
mental theorem of calculus to derive
N∑
j=1
(
∂yjGj(y)− ∂yjGj(w)
)
(yj − wj)
=
∫ 1
0
(
N∑
j,k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(w + t(y − w))(yk − wk)(yj − wj)
)
dt
≥ 0.
We are left to verify assertion (iv). First note that by part (ii),
|∂yjGj(y)| ≤ |∂yjGj(y)− ∂yjGj(0)|+ |∂yjGj(0)|
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ 1
0
N∑
k=1
∂yk∂yjGj(ty)ykdt
∣∣∣∣∣+ |∂yjGj(0)|
≤
N∑
k=1
(∫ 1
0
∣∣∂yk∂yjGj(ty)∣∣ dt) |yk|+ |∂yjGj(0)|
≤ 1
θ
N∑
k=1
|yk|+ |∂yjGj(0)|
≤ D(1 + |y|)
for some D > 0 independent of j = 1, . . . , N and y.
For a given y ∈ RN there is a unique z such that ∂zjFj(z) = yj and ∂yjGj(y) = zj for
j = 1, . . . , N . We just showed above that
|zj| = |∂yjGj(y)| ≤ D(1 + |y|).
In view of hypothesis, (A.1) and our definition of Gj (A.6), we additionally have
|Gj(y)| = |zjyj − Fj(z)|
≤ |zj||yj|+ |Fj(z)|
≤ D(1 + |y|)|y|+ C(1 + |z|2)
≤ D(1 + |y|)|y|+ C(1 +ND2(1 + |y|)2)
≤ B(1 + |y|2)
for an appropriately chosen constant B.
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